2007-09-08
■ Susan Brownmiller 1 
（この記事は書きかけです）
ベトナム戦争時の米軍軍用売春施設
秦郁彦先生が幾つかの論述で要約している箇所の原文です。（なんちゃって翻訳はぼちぼちやります。）
Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape
- 作者: Susan Brownmiller
- 出版社/メーカー: Ballantine Books
- 発売日: 1993/05/11
- メディア: ペーパーバック
- クリック: 3回
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In December, 1972, when the Paris "peace" talks had finally reached an intensive phase, I had several long interviews in New York with Peter Arnett, Associated Press correspondent in Vietnam for eight years. Like the rest of Saigon press corps, this Pulitzer Prize winner had never filed a rape story from Vietnam, but like the rest of the press corps he had certainly been aware of its incidence. When he began to think about it, Arnett was able to delineate rape in Vietnam on many levels.
パリ『和平』会談がようやく大詰めを迎えた1972年12月、ニューヨークで、私は、APのベトナム特派員を8年間勤めているピーター・アーネットに長時間に及ぶインタービューを数回おこなった。他のサイゴン詰めの記者たちと同じく、ピュリッツァー賞受賞者であるアーネットもベトナムから強姦に関する記事を投稿したことはなかったが、これまた他の記者たちと同じく、彼も強姦が起きていることははっきりと認識していた。そのことに思い至ったとき、アーネットは、ベトナム国内の強姦について、多様なレベルで描写することができるようになった。
(p. 87)
It was Arnett's opinion (not shared by me) that the U.S. Army was "more enlightened" than the Marine Corps when it came to sexual accommodation. By 1966 the 1st Cavalry Division at An Khe, in the Central Highlands, the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, twenty-five miles north of Saigon, and the 4th Infantry Division at Pleiku had established official military brothels within the perimeter of their base camps.
アーネットの見解では（私は同意しなかったが）、性提供施設については、米陸軍は米海兵隊よりも「進んで」いた。1966年には、中部高原地帯にあるアン・ケに駐留していた第1騎兵師団、サイゴンの北25マイルにあるライ・ケに駐留していた第1歩兵師団、そしてプレイク駐留の第4歩兵師団は、それぞれのベース･キャンプの外辺部内に公認の軍用売春施設を設営していた。
The Lai Khe "recreation area" belonging to the base camp of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was one-acre compound surrounded by barbed wire with American MP's standing guard at the gate. It was opened only during daylight hours for security reasons. Inside the compound there were shops that sold hot dogs, hamburgers and souvenirs, but the main attraction was two concrete barracks, each about one hundred feet long—the military whorehouses that serviced the four-thousand-man brigade. Each building was outfitted with two bars, a bandstand, and sixty curtained cubicles in which the Vietnamese women lived and worked.
第1歩兵師団第3旅団が所有していたライ・ケの「レクリエーション・エリア」は、面積1エーカーで、有刺鉄線で周囲が囲まれており、ゲートにはMPが歩哨に立っていた。保安上の理由から、営業していたのは昼間だけであった。敷地内には、ホットドッグ、ハンバーガー、土産物を売る店が複数あったが、売りは、どちらも長さ約100フィートのコンクリート・バラック2棟－4000人からなる旅団に性的サービスを与えるための軍用売春施設－であった。それぞれのバラックにはバーが2つ、バンド用ステージが１つ、そして入り口にカーテンがかかった小部屋が60室あり、小部屋の中でベトナム人女性が住み込みで働いていた。
An individual cubicle contained little more than a table with a thin mattress on it and a peg on one wall for the girl's change of clothing. On opposite wall a Playboy nude centerfold provided decoration and stimulation for the visiting soldier. The women who lived in the Lai Khe recreation-center cubicles were garishly made up with elaborate, sprayed bouffant hairdos and many had enlarged their breasts with silicon injections as a concession to Western fetish. The sexual service, as Arnett described it, was "quick, straight, and routine," and the women were paid five hundred piasters (the equivalent of two dollars in American money) for each turn by their GI clients. Americans always paid in piasters. For each trick she turned, a girl would get to keep two hundred piasters (seventy-five cents), the rest going to various levels of payoffs. By turning eight to ten tricks a day a typical prostitute in the Lai Khe compound earned more per month than her GI clients, Arnett advised me—a curious sidelight to a not-so-free enterprise system.
Refugees who had lost their homes and families during the war and veterans of the earlier Saigon bar trade formed the stock of the brothel. They were recruited by the province chief, who took his payoff, and were channeled into town by the mayor of Lai Khe, who also got his cut. The American military, which kept its hands partially clean by leaving the procurement and price arrangement to Vietnamese civilians, controlled and regulated the health and security features of the trade. "The girls were checked a swabbed every week for VD by Army medics," my informed source told me approvingly.
Military brothels on Army base camps ("Sin Cities," "Disneylands" or "boom-boom parlors") were built by decision of a division commander, a two-star general, and were under the direct operational control of a brigade commander with the rank of colonel. Clearly, Army brothels in Vietnam existed by the grace of Army Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland, the United States Embassy in Saigon, and the Pentagon.
Venereal disease, mostly gonorrhea, was a major preoccupation of the military in Vietnam. One official brothel outside Saigon had a sign on the wall of the bar that "GIRLS WITH TAGS ARE CLEAN." Lest the declaration failed to make its point, a sign on the opposite wall spelled out "GIRLS WITHOUT TAGS ARE DISEASED." It was mandatory for all units to report their incidence of VD to the higher-ups, since it reflected on military discipline as well as on the health of the soldiery; and a high VD count was charged against the merit rating of a battalion. "Most units lied about their VD count," Arnett believed. It was also his understanding that the reported VD rate "was high from the beginning" in relation to other wars and to a normal civilian population. (In 1969 GI's contracted venereal disease in Vietnam at a reported rate of 200 cases per 1,000 persons; the United States rate at the time was 32).
(pp. 94-96. Emphasis added.)
ベトナム戦争時の米軍によるベトナム人女性の強姦について興味深い考察があったので、引用しておきます。
Despite the intense propaganda throughout the long war, our American soldiers did not believe that they were "liberating" anyone, nor were they perceived as liberators. Men in the field were perpetually in a tenuous, frustrating semicombat situation. As Arnett described it, "There were no fixed targets, no objectives, no highways to take—it was patrol and repatrol, search and destroy. Anything outside the perimeter of the base camp or the nearest government-controlled village was enemy territory, and all civilians were treated as enemy. It was so easy to rape on a squad level. Soldiers would enter a village without an interpreter. Nobody spoke Vietnamese. It was an anonymous situation. Any American could grab any woman as a suspect and there was little or no recourse to the law by the people.
Raping and looting go hand in hand in warfare but there was little to loot in the villages of South Vietnam. Arnett believed that the juxtaposition of fragile, small-boned Vietnamese women again tall, strong American men created an exaggerated masculine-feminine dynamic that lent itself readily rape (a similar situation had occurred in Bangladesh). He thought that the Americans participated more in gang rape than in individual assault, the style of the South Vietnamese Army, "because the Americans were trained in the buddy system, for security. They were warned against the dangers of individual fraternizing on operations." The likelihood of sexual assault diminished, he believed, "if the company commander was present—a career officer, a captain or a lieutenant. The noncoms and soldiers had less at stake." His final observation, shared by his Vietnamese wife, his wife's family and others he knew, was that whatever the incidence of atrocity from 1965 on, "the Americans' personal conduct was far better historically than the French, their mercenaries, or the Japanese."
(pp. 97-98. Emphasis added.)
